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TAX-FREE CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS-THE LAW
AND THE PROPOSED REGULATIONS*

Robert L. Merrittt
The king cried aI.oud. to bring in the astrologers, the Chaldeans,
and the soothsayers. And the king spake, and said to the wise men
of Babylon, Whosoever shall read this writing, and show me the interpretation thereof, shall be clothed. with scarlet, and have a chain of
gold about his neck, and shall be the third ruler in the kingdom.
DANIEL 5:7
HE quest for interpretation is indeed an ancient one. Our life
path is pervaded by a search for meanings.
It has been said of the law that it is sometimes better to have a
bad rule than to have no rule. I suppose the rationale is that unsatisfactory certainties at least permit action, and are susceptible to a change
for the better, the very badness of the rule serving to accelerate the
equitable resolution. Being neither philosopher nor historian, I do
not know whether that patience which awaits ultimate improvement
is always a virtue.1
Two tools of the practicing lawyer in dealing with the affairs of
his clients are the Internal Revenue Code and the Treasury Regulations which, to paraphrase the learned judge, are the administrative
moons reflecting the light of the statute. In a measure, the writer
and enforcer of the Regulations is the "third ruler in the kingdom."
The Congress enacts the law, and the courts are the last resort:2 of
interpretation and application. In between lies great responsibility.3

T

* This article is based in part on a paper, "Tax-Free Acquisition of Corporate Business" which was delivered by the author on November 9, 1954 at the New York University 13th Annual Institute on Federal Taxation. The proceedings of that Institute are
published by Matthew Bender & Company, Albany, New York.
t Member, New York and Ohio Bars.-Ed.
1 Cf. Justice Reed's dissenting opinion in Commissioner v. Estate of Sternberger, 348
U.S. 187 at 200-201, 75 S.Ct. 229 (1955): ''There is a certain hesitation in dissenting
from an interpretation of a tax statute re~ediable by Congress, but as the Court's decision
springs, we think, from an overemphasis on regulations, a protest may have usefulness as
a counterweight against future extensions of such treatment to statutory language."
2 Pending, of course, a further round when the Congress enacts additional or remedial
legislation.
3 The Internal Revenue Service should be ever mindful that "unless the tax asserted
by the Commissioner has been authorized by Congress, it fails of validity••••" Helvering
v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371 at 394, 63 S.Ct. 636 (1943).
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The Bar is particularly concerned at this time that this responsibility be
conscientiously fullilled. Forthrightness in interpretation should
cause no one to fear the lion's den.
This article will illustrate, by reference to some aspects of the new
"B" (corporate acquisition of stock) and "C" (corporate acquisition of
property) reorganization definitions, instances in which the impatient
practitioner would replace proposed certainties ( or neglected or inadvertent uncertainties) with more seemly interpretations.
Corporate mergers and acquisitions are part of the dynamics of
the business world. The financial pages report the increasing rate at
which mergers and other corporate acquisitions are being effected.
The strengthening of the economy through these means, subject to
the restraints and philosophy of the antitrust laws, is generally to be
encouraged.4 Since 1918 the tax law has contained rules causing the
nonrecognition of gain or loss realized as a result of such corporate
transactions.5 The particular rules governing nonrecognition have
been changed over the years, 6 and periodically a reexamination has
been made of the directions chosen and the effectiveness of the statutory
solutions.
The preparation of H.R. 83007 offered a splendid opportunity to
the Congress and the Treasury to reexamine the reorganization provisions of the 1939 code with a view toward clarifying uncertainties in
meaning, writing into the statute some of the products of judicial
decision and remedying by clear language the occasional harsh imprints
on the body of law which have resulted therefrom. Unfortunately, the
4 BtlTTERS, l..rnnmR AND CAllY, EFFECTS OF T AXATION-CoRPORATll MERGERS,
c. 1 (1951), discuss opposing viewpoints as to whether recent merger activity is significantly promoting industrial concentration and monopoly. The book analyzes the effect of
raxes on the sale of profitable closely held companies. See also REPORT OF THE A'ITORNEY
GENERAL's NATIONAL CoMMI'lTllll To STUDY THE ANrrrnusT LAws (March 31, 1955);
REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE CoMMisSION ON CoRPORATll MERGERS AND ACQmSI•
TIONS (May 1955).
5 The Revenue Act of 1918, §202(b) provided certain nomecognition rules in the
case of a "reorganization, merger or consolidation." No definition of these terms appeared
in the statute until §202(c)(2) of the Revenue Act of 1921 was enacted.
6 See 3 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION, c. 20 (1942 and 1954 Supp.);
PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION, Third Series, 1-165 (1940). See also H. Rep.
1337, 83d Cong., 2d sess., p. 34 (1954).
7 H.R. 8300, as passed by the House of Representatives on March 18, 1954, will be
referred to as the "House Bill," and as passed by the Senate on July 2, 1954 will be
referred to as the "Senate Bill." H.R. 8300, as passed by Congress on July 29, 1954 and
enacted into law on August 16, 1954 as P.L. 591, 83d Cong., 2d sess., will be referred
to as the "Internal Revenue Code of 1954," "1954 code'' or "I.R.C. (1954)." The prior
law will be referred to with 1939 designations. See I.R.C. (1954), §770l(a)(29). H no
code designation is indicated, the 1954 code is meant.
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reach exceeded the grasp; the result of the legislative effort has been
to multiply the uncertainties. The fault is not all in the statute; the
interpretation thereof is wanting. The Proposed Regulations under
section 368 (the "reorganization" definitions section) deal with the
new areas of doubt by either ignoring their existence or resolving them
in favor of recognition of gain or loss. The first course, while disappointing, is not affirmatively harmful. The solutions obtained
through the second course warrant reconsideration by the Treasury.

I.

"NET EFFECT" AND

"STEP

TRANSACTION" PROBLEMS

The House Bill and the accompanying Ways and Means Committee Report are keys to the proper interpretation of section 368.8
This is so even though the House Bill abandoned the familiar reorganization terminology and introduced entirely new concepts. Much
of the substance of the House Bill with respect to corporate acquisitions
of stock9 or property1° was continued in modified form in the Senate
Bill, and was enacted as the "B"11 and "C"12 reorganization definitions.
The Ways and Means Committee had admirable objectives, one
of which was to make the law sufficiently definite to permit taxpayers
to ascertain in advance the tax consequences of their actions when
effecting corporate distributions and adjustments. The House Bill
was designed to promote clarity and certainty and "to insure that the
same tax consequences result from the different types of transactions
which are available to accomplish substantially the same result."13
Taxpayers were to be prevented from in effect choosing the type of
tax for which they would be liable through a choice of one road rather
than another to the same destination.
The Senate Finance Committee agreed with the above objectives,
but balked at the House Bill solutions. It felt that the House Bill
achieved certainty at the sacrifice of the legislative flexibility needed to
8 The history of how the House Bill came into being and the extent of the influence
of the Income Tax Project of the American Law Institute on that bill is discussed in
Darrell, "The Internal Revenue Code of 1954," 1955 SounmRN CALIFORNIA TAX INsnTU'I'B 1 (1955). See American Law Institute, Federal Income, Estate and Gift Tax
Project, CoMPAIUSON OF THE .AMERICAN LAw INsTITaTB FEBRUARY, 1954 INco:r.m TAX
DRAFT AND 1954 !NrnRNAL REvBNcm ConB, p. 20 (February 1, 1955).
o House Bill, §359(b).
10 House Bill, §359(c).
11 I.R.C. (1954), §368(a)(l)(B).
121.R.C. (1954), §368(a)(l)(C).
13 H. Rep. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d sess., p. 39 (1954). See also p. 34. H. Rep. 1337 is
hereinafter referred to as "House Report."
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provide an equitable statutory pattern for taxing the numerous varieties
of corporate reorganizations.14
It is surprising, in view of these expressions of intent, to find that
the Proposed Regulations under section 368 fail to mention the possible
application of a "net effect" test or the "step transaction" rule either
generally, or in connection with specific situations, such as those dis·
cussed below. Continuing in substance the language of the Regula·
tions15 which interpret the 1939 code, the Proposed Regulations16
provide, "Section 368(a)(l) limits the definition of the term 'r~
organization' to six kinds of transactions and excludes all others. From
its context, the term 'a party to a reorganization' can only mean a party
to a transaction specifically defined as a reorganization by section
368(a). . . . A plan of reorganization must contemplate the bona
fide execution of one of the transactions specifically described as a
reorganization in section 368(a) and for [sic] the bona fide consumma•
tion of each of the requisite acts under which nonrecognition of gain
is claimed...."17 This is a strong brew of "specificallys," made even
stronger by the further statement in the Proposed Regulations18 that
"The application of the term 'reorganization' is to be strictly limited
to the specific transactions set forth in section 368(a). . . ."
If there were not a history of the courts applying a "net effect"19
test, and of. the Internal Revenue Service itself urging such a test in
particular cases, this would be troublesome language indeed. But
even so, the problem is not a simple one and requires some attention.
Primarily, if there is to be a net effect test contended for by the Service
and applied by the courts, the Regulations should leave some leeway
for the application of such a test. The Regulations should not be
written so as to be disregarded on suitable occasions. In addition,
where does the taxpayer stand where the convenient and direct path
is not "specifically" spelled out in the statute or the Regul~tions, but
14S. Rep. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 41-42 (1954). S. Rep. 1622 is hereinafter
referred to as "Senate Report."
15 Treas. Reg. 118, §39.112(g)-1.
16Proposed Regulations §1.368-l(c). The Proposed Regulations were published in
the Federal Register on December 11, 1954.
17 Italics supplied. This provision may have originally been based on the statutory
statement that "the term 'reorganization' means" etc. See Hendricks, "Federal Income Tax:
Definition of 'Reorganization,'" 45 H.Allv. L. REv. 648 at 650 (1932), which observes
that "The use of this word probably indicates that the definition shall not be susceptible
of expansion or addition.•••"
18.Proposed Regulations, §l.368-2(a). See also Proposed Regulations, §l.368-2(g).
·, 19 See Mintz and Plumb, "Step Transactions in Corporate Reorganizations," N.Y.U.
12-ra AmmAL INSTITUTE oN FEDERAL TAXATION 247 at 250 (1954), which refers to this
as an "end result" test, under which a given intended J:esult will have the same tax effect

1955]

TAX-FREB

CoRPORATB AcQuismoNs

915

the inconvenient and roundabout route clearly meets one of the reorganization definitions? Does getting to Scotland ·on the low road
require the giving up of (nonrecognition) rights which accompany
the taking of the high road?

A.

The Groman and Bashford Rules

The "net effect" problems created by the 1954 code, which the
Proposed Regulations leave unresolved in some instances and which
they unsatisfactorily resolve in others, can be illustrated by examples of
the operation of the revised Groman20 and Bashford21 rules.22
In the Groman case Glidden Company formed an Ohio corporation and became the owner for a cash consideration of all of its common stock. Pursuant to an agreement contemplating such action,
to which agreement Glidden was a party, the shareholders of an
Indiana corporation transferred all their shares of stock in that corporation to Ohio in exchange23 for the latter's nonvoting 6 percent cumulative preferred stock, 7 percent prior preferred stock of Glidden, and
cash. After Ohio acquired all of Indiana's outstanding stock, the latter
was dissolved. Ohio thus coming into possession of all of Indiana's
assets. 24 The issue in the case was whether the receipt of the Glidden
7 percent prior preferred stock by Indiana's shareholders constituted
taxable income to them, it being conceded that the receipt of Ohio's
preferred stock did not and that the receipt of the cash did.
whether achieved directly or by circuitous steps. The authors consider this to be a refinement of the "step transaction" doctrine that a single transaction cannot be broken up into
its component steps.
20 Groman v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 82, 58 S.Ct. 108 (1937), opinion amended
and rehearing den. 302 U.S. 654, 58 S.Ct. 108 (1937).
21 Helvering v. Bashford, 302 U.S. 454, 58 S.Ct. 307 (1937).
22 See also Merritt, "Tax-Free Acquisition of Corporate Business," N.Y.U. 13th
AmroAL !NsnTOT.B ON F:EI>ERAL TAXATION 693 (1955); Lurie, "Namorg-Or Groman
Reversed," 10 TAX L. REv. 119 (1954).
23 The Supreme Court, in the Groman case, originally stated that the shareholders of
Indiana received nothing from Glidden. The record was not clear as to whether Indiana's
shareholders received the Glidden stock from Glidden or from Ohio. The taxpayer petitioned for a rehearing on the ground, unsupported by the record, that the stock was received
from Glidden. Apparently to eliminate any implication that this factor was important to
its decision, the Supreme Court corrected its opinion by deleting the statement. Groman
v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 654, 58 S.Ct. 108 (1937). See Lawrence v. Commissioner,
(7th Cir. 1941) 123 F. (2d) 555 at 558; Michigan Steel Corp. of New Jersey, 38 B.T.A.
435 at 451 (1938), appeal dismissed (6th Cir. 1940) 116 F. (2d) 280; PAuL, STUDIES IN
F:EI>ERAL TAXATION, Third Series, 107 (1940).
·
24 Under the Revenue Act of 1928, §112(i)(l)(A), these transactions qualified as a
"reorganization" because there was "an acquisition by one corporation of at least a majority
of the voting stock and at least a majority of the total number of shares of all other classes
of stock of another corporation, or substantially all the properties of another corporation.•••"
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It was unanimously held that Glidden, although it contracted for
the exchange and made it possible by subscribing and paying for Ohio's
common stock in cash so that Ohio could consummate the exchange,
was not a party to the reorganization, for it received nothing from the
shareholders of Indiana, the exchange being between Indiana's shareholders and Ohio. The Supreme Court characterized Glidden as
merely "the efficient agent in bringing about a reorganization. It was
not, in the natural meaning of the term, a party to the reorganization."25
Moreover, the shareholders of Indiana, through ownership of Glidden
preferred stock, did not retain a "continued substantial interest" in the
assets conveyed to Ohio. Further, said the Supreme Court, Glidden's
preferred stock was· "other property" "in the sense that its ownership
represented a participation in assets in which Ohio, and its shareholders
through it, has no proprietorship." Accordingly, the receipt by
Indiana's shareholders of Glidden's preferred stock was treated as the
receipt of boot.
The failure of the Supreme Court to find the requisite continuity
of interest of Indiana's shareholders in the assets transferred to Ohio,
through their ownership of Glidden prior preferred stock, was indeed
unfortunate. 26 The Groman decision and its progeny, with their unduly narrow application of the "continuity of interest" doctrine, stymied
many a desired reorganization. It was generally recognized that a
legislative reversal was necessary. 27 The 1954 code has offered some
relief, but either due to a faulty analysis of the problem or to the haste
in which the Senate Bill was written, some further legislative relief is
still required. Moreover, since the Proposed Regulations ignore the
"net effect" test, even areas in which Congress has acted will require
judicial or statutory clarification unless the final Regulations adopt a
more reasonable approach.
To facilitate an analysis of the 1954 code provisions, and the
Proposed Regulations thereunder, I will first outline some of the
factual patterns in which the Groman and Bashford and related cases
arose. (It should be borne in mind in considering the examples that
the facts have been considerably simplified, and that some of the cases
arose under statutes which treated the actual transactions involved as
"reorganizations," although under present definitions they would not
so qualify.)
302 U.S. 82 at 89, 58 S.Ct. 108 (1937).
For criticisms of the Groman decision, see Lurie, "Namorg-Or Groman Reversed,"
IO TAX L. RBv. 119 at 123-124 (1954); MAcILL, TAXABLE lNcoMB, rev. ed., 160 (1945);
PAUL, STUDIES IN F.EDERAL TAXAnoN, Third Series, 119-121 (1940).
27 See PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXAnoN, Third Series, 121 (1940).
25
26
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Example 1: Corporation P wishes to acquire all the assets of
Corporation W. Corporation P forms a new subsidiary, Corporation A, to which the shareholders of Corporation W transfer
all their stock in exchange for voting stock of Corporation P.
Corporation W is then dissolved. 28
(a) The Corporation W shareholders receive the Corporation P stock from Corporation A.
(b) The Corporation W shareholders receive the Corporation P stock from Corporation P.29
Example 2: The same facts as in Example l(b), except that
Corporation P receives the Corporation W stock and then as part
of the plan of reorganization, or within the contemplation thereof,
transfers it to Corporation A, so that Corporation P has momentary possession of Corporation A's stock.30
Example 3: Corporation W transfers all its assets to Corporation A in exchange for voting stock of the latter's parent, Corporation P. Corporation W distributes the Corporation P stock to i~
shareholders and dissolves. 31
(a) Corporation W (or its shareholders) receives the Corporation P stock from Corporation A.
(b) Corporation W (or its shareholders) receives the Corporation P stock from Corporation P.
Example 4: The same facts as in Example 3 (b), except that
Corporation P receives the Corporation W assets and then as a
part of the plans of reorganization, or within the contemplation
thereof, transfers them to Corporation A, so that Corporation P
has momentary possession of Corporation W's assets.82
2 8 Groman v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 82, 58 S.Ct. 108 (1937). Cf. Lawrence v.
Commissioner, (7th Cir. 1941) 123 F. (2d) 555.
29 See note 23 supra.
30 This is essentially the difference in facts between the Bashford and Groman cases.
Cf. Gertrude B. Chase, 44 B.T.A. 39 (1941) (reviewed) non-acq. 1941-1 Cum. Bul. 13;
1942-1 Cum. Bul. 20, affd. per curiam (2d Cir. 1942) 128 F. (2d) 740; Commissioner
v. Kahn, (6th Cir. 1942) 133 F. (2d) 199. In both of these cases Corporation P temporarily
put Corporation Ws stock in the possession of Corporation A; Corporation P was held to be a
party to the reorganization.
31 Hedden v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1939) 105 F. (2d) 311, cert. den. 308 U.S.
575, 60 S.Ct. 117 (1939), rehearing den. 308 U.S. 636, 60 S.Ct. 172 (1939); Davis v.
United States, (Ct. Cl. 1939) 26 F. Supp. 1007, cert. den. 308 U.S. 574, 60 S.Ct. 90
(1939); Neicllich v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1939) 105 F. (2d) 1019, cert. den. 308
U.S. 599, 60 S.Ct. 130 (1939); Michigan Steel Corp., 38 B.T.A. 435 (1938), appeal
dismissed (6th Cir. 1940) 116 F. (2d) 280; Park & Tilford, 43 B.T.A. 348, 374, 375
(1941) (reviewed); Richard K. Mellon, 12 T.C. 90 (1949), affd. on another issue (3d
Cir. 1950) 184 F. (2d) 157.
32 Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Helvering, (8th Cir. 1940) 115 F. (2d) 662, cert. den.
312 U.S. 699, 61 S.Ct. 739 (1941).

9l8

MICHIGAN

LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 53

Example .5: Corporation W transfers all its assets for 80 percent
of the common stock of Corporatio:n A, only common being issued
and outstanding. Corporation W, as part of the plan of reorganization, or within the contemplation thereof, then transfers the
stock of Corporation A thus received by it, for voting stock of
Corporation P, which thereupon becomes the parent of Corporation A. Corporation W distributes the Corporation P .stock to its
shareholders and dissolves. 33
Example 6: The same facts as in Examples 2 or 4, except that
the second transfer is not part of the plan of reorganization or
a contemplated variant thereof, but is an independent transaction
and not an essential (or indeed any) part of the plan.34
The above examples are simplified for the purposes of this discussion by having Corporation W or its shareholders receive only
voting stock of Corporation P, and no other stock or cash or other
property. Under section 354(a) and its predecessors311 no gain or loss
is recognized ( with certain limitations not pertinent at the moment)
"if stock or securities in a corporation a party to a reorganization are, in
pursuance of the plan of reorganization, exchanged solely for stock
or securities in such corporation or in another corporation a party to
the reorganization." In each of the above examples, other than example
6, Corporation P was held not to be a party to a reorganization, and the
receipt of its stock was treated as the receipt of ''boot."
B.

The Revised Groman and Bashford Rules

It is not clear exactly how far the Congress intended to go with
respect to offering legislative relief. The Ways and Means Committee
Report states, ''Your committee eliminates the technical requirements
of existing law that the corporation cannot acquire assets in a merger
in exchange for the stock of its parent[,] thus overruling Groman . . .
33 Whitney Corp. v. Commissioner, (8th Cir. 1939) 105 F. (2d) 438; United Light
& Power Co. v. Commissioner, (7th Cir. 1939) 105 F. (2d) 866, cert. den. 308 U.S. 574,
60 S.Ct. 90 (1939); Commissioner v. First Nat. Bank of Altoona, (3d Cir. 1939) 104 F.
(2d) 865; American Light & Traction Co., 42 B.T.A. 1121 (1940) (non-acq.), affd. on
other grounds (7th Cir. 1942) 125 F. (2d) 365. But d. Ballwood Co. v. Commissioner,
(3d Cir. 1936) 84 F. (2d) 733.
34 Robert Campbell, 15 T.C. 312 (1950) (acq.). See Mintz and Plumb, "Step
Transactions in Corporate Reorganizations," N.Y.U. 12TH ANNuAL INSTITUTE oN FEDEllAL
TAXAnoN 247, 252 (1954).
35 I.R.C. (1939), and the Revenue Acts of 1938, 1936, 1934, 1928, §ll2(b)(3).
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and . . . Bashford. . . ."36 Referring to another aspect of the problem,
the Report states that under the House Bill "a corporation may acquire
assets for immediate transfer to a controlled subsidiary, or may arrange
for the transfer of the assets directly from the transferor corporation to
such subsidiary, thus changing present law under . . . Groman . . .
and . . . Bashford. . . ."37 The Senate Committee Report adds
nothing signi6.cant to this language,38 except that it refers to the new
rule which deals with the 6.rst aspect of the problem as modifying3 9
rather than overruling Groman and Bashford.
The ultimate test, of course, is what the statute provides. The
"C" reorganization de6.nition has been modi6.ed by adding thereto
the parenthetical expression in section 368(a)(l)(C), which would
permit the acquisition by one corporation of substantially all of the
properties of another corporation, "in exchange solely for all or a part
of its voting stock ( or in exchange solely for all or a part of the voting
stock of a corporation which is in control of the acquiring corporation)
. . . ." In addition, section 368(a)(2)(C) speci6.cally provides that
a transaction otherwise qualifying as an "A" or a "C" reorganization
is not disquali6.ed as such ''by reason of the fact that part or all of the
assets which were acquired in the transaction are transferred to a
corporation controlled by the corporation acquiring such assets."
In addition to the modi6.cation of the "C" reorganization de6.nition
in the manner indicated above, the "party to a reorganization" de6.nition has been expanded to include Corporation P where Corporation
A acquires substantially all of the properties of Corporation W in
exchange for a part or all of the voting stock of Corporation P, the
86 House Report, p. 40. Emphasis added. The SUMMARY OF H.R. 8300, nm PRoPOSBD INrERNAL REvmrnE CoDE OF 1954 AS PASSED BY nm HousE OF RBPIU!SENTAnv.8S,
which was prepared for the use of the Senate Committee on Finance by the technical staff
of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, makes the remarkable statement that
the House Bill "eliminates a formality of existing law." See Hearings Before the Committee on Finance, United States Senate, 83d Cong., 2d sess., part I, p. 34 (April 7 and
8, 1954). Perhaps here is the key to why the statute leaves so many loose ends-its
drafters may not have had time to study fully the problem and its ramifications. See text
to note 109 infra, indicating a situation where the Groman decision may be far from
"overruled."
s1 Page Al34. Emphasis added.
SSThe Senate Bill, §368(a)(2)(C), however, did extend the House Bill rules "to
include a case where the parent corporation receives the assets in a statutory merger or
consolidation and immediately transfers part or all of the assets to a subsidiary." Senate
Report, p. 52.
39 Id. at 273. See also SuMMARY oF THB NEw PROVISIONS OF nm lNTERNAL Rllv:Emm ConE oF 1954 (H.R. 8300) AS AcRBBD To BY nm CoNFERBEs (Punuc I.Aw 591,
83d CoNc.), prepared by the Staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation,
p. 44 (1955).

920

MrcHIGAN

LAw R.Evmw

[ Vol. 53

latter being in "control"40 of Corporation A. While not spelled out in
the statute it would appear that the stock of Corporation P can move
directly from that corporation to Corporation W or its shareholders,
without :6.rst being transferred by Corporation P to Corporation A.41

I. Acquisition of stock and liquidation of subsidiary. Whether
the 1954 code merely "modi:6.es" or in fact "overrules" the Groman
and Bashford decisions is a critical question. An obvious defect of the
statute is its failure speci:6.cally to apply the new rules to "B" reorganizations. Thus, where Corporation W stock received by Corporation
P in a "B" reorganization is transferred by Corporation P to its whollyowned subsidiary, Corporation A1 as part of the plan of reorganization
or within the contemplation thereof, the receipt by Corporation W
shareholders of Corporation P voting stock will result in a taxable
transaction. 42 This may also be so even where Corporation W is
forthwith dissolved pursuant to the plan (the Bashford case!). Likewise, a direct transfer to Corporation A of Corporation W stock in
exchange for voting stock of Corporation P1 Corporation W then being
dissolved (the Groman case!), may not qualify as a tax-free exchange.
Indeed, of the examples set forth above, the new rules only apply
speci:6.cally to change the results in examples 3 and 4. Nevertheless,
it is probable that the courts will extend the new rules to cover
examples I 1 2 and 5 as well. Since the end results in examples I
through 5 are identical, the tax consequences should not be different.
The statute should have been drafted to so provide in clear terms. As
it is, taxpayers will have to rely upon a "step transaction" or "net effect"
approach to have examples 11 2 and 5 ruled to be "C" reorganizations.
40Because I.R.C. (1954), §368(c) defines "control" to mean "the ownership of stock
possessing at least 80 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock
entitled to vote and at least 80 percent of the total number of shares of all other classes of
stock of the corporation," the above rules apply only where the relationship of Corporation
P and Corporation A is as so defined. In a transaction where there is any lesser degree of
control of Corporation A by Corporation P, the Groman and Bashford rules continue to
govern.

41 In Davis v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1939) 26 F. Supp. 1007, the Court of Claims
held that the delivery by Corporation P of its stock directly to Corporation W was, "in
legal contemplation," the same as the issuance by Corporation P of its stock to Corporation
A and the delivery by Corporation A of Corporation P's stock to Corporation W in exchange for the latter's assets. Cf. note 23 supra.
Query whether the basis of the assets acquired will depend upon which route is
chosen to get Corporation P and Corporation A stock into the hands of Corporation W
or its shareholders, or to get Corporation W assets into the hands of Corporation A.
42ALI Draft, §X60I(c) and (d) provides a more desirable rule. Comment, February
1954 Draft, American Law Institute Income Tax Project, Vol. II, p. 311, illustrates the
proposed rule as follows: " .•• assume Corporation A owns 10 per cent of the shares of
Corporation X and Corporation B, which is in control of Corporation A, owns 30 per cent of
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A step transaction approach has thus far been taken by the
courts,4 3 so that where liquidation of a newly acquired subsidiary
is part of a plan to acquire its assets, the preliminary exchange of stock
will be disregarded and the transaction will be viewed as a corporate
acquisition of assets. A somewhat troublesome feature, however, is
that the Proposed Regulations completely ignore the problem. Moreover, the Internal Revenue Service has never withdrawn its nonacquiescence in the Whittell44 case, despite a reliance upon that case
in subsequent litigation where its result has been helpful to the government's position.45 Also, there is some intimation in the Ways and
Means Committee Report46 that a step transaction rule may not ordinarily be applied where a "corporate acquisition of stock" is followed
by a "subsequent immediate liquidation" of the corporation whose stock
is acquired. It would have been well if a speci:6.c statement had been
the shares of X. The shareholders of X may transfer 25 per cent [or more] of their shares
to A and 15 per cent [or more] to B. Likewise, on the other side of the transaction, the
stock acquired by the transferring shareholders may be received directly by a corporation
controlled by them."
43 See George Whittell & Co., 34 '.B.T.A. 1070 (1936) (reviewed) non-acq. 1937-1
Cum. Bui. 53 and 1939-2 Cum. Bui. 72; Mente & Co., 24 B.T.A. 401 (1931) (reviewed);
Tennessee, Alabama & Georgia Ry. Co., 13 T.C. 486 (1949) (reviewed), affd. (6th Cir.
1951) 187
(2d) 826; WAGE, Inc., 19 T.C. 249 (1952); Ahles Realty Corp. v.
Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1934) 71 F. (2d) 150, cert. den. 293 U.S. 611, 55 S.Ct. 141
(1934); Commissioner v. Dana, (3d Cir. 1939) 103 F. (2d) 359 (alternate holding
under 1928 act). See also White, "Avoiding Pitfalls in Acquiring a Subsidiary Under
Section 112(g)(l)(B)," N.Y.U. 8TH ANmrAL lNsTITUTB ON FEDERAL TAXATION 193 at
200 (1950); Mintz and Plumb, "Step Transactions in Corporate Reorganizations," N.Y.U.
12TH ANmrAL INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 247 at 283 (1954); 3 MERTENS, LAw oP
FEDERAL lNcoME TAXATION §20.76 (1942). Cf. I.R.C. (1954), §334(b)(2), which
treats a corporate acquisition of stock by "purchase," followed by a liquidation of the
acquired corporation, as a direct purchase of the assets of the acquired corporation for
purposes of determining the basis to the transferee of the acquired assets. Kimbell-Diamond
Milling Co. v. Commissioner, (5th Cir. 1951) 187 F. (2d) 718, affirming 10 T.C. 7
(1948), cert. den. 342 U.S. 827, 72 S.Ct. 50 (1951).
44 Note 43 supra. It is not clear why these are two non-acquiescences in this case,
which involved a taxable year prior to the enactment of the tax-free liquidation of a
subsidiary provision. See Revenue Act of 1934, §112(b)(6), as added by 1935 Act, §110;
1936 Act, 1938 Act and I.R.C. (1939), §ll2(b)(6); I.R.C. (1954), §332.
45 E.g., Tennessee, Alabama & Georgia Ry. Co., 13 T.C. 486 (1949), affd. (6th Cir.
1951) 187 F. (2d) 826.
46 House Report, p. Al 28, first full paragraph, indicating a need for a special basis
rule to get a "step transaction" result. See also Senate Report, p. 48, re the codilication of
the Kimbell-Diamond rule by I.R.C. (1954), §334(b)(2). See note 43 supra.
Cohen, Silverman, Surrey, Tarleau and Warren, "The Internal Revenue Code of
1954: Corporate Distributions, Organizations, and Reorganizations," 68 HARv. L. REv.
393 at 415, n. 167 (1955), find "an appreciable amount of indirect support" for a "step
transaction" rule in a passage in the Conference Committee Report [H. Rep. 2543, 83d
Cong., 2d sess., at 41 (1954)]. Taxpayers may find less comfort than do the five authors
in the passage, which deals with a tax avoidance device (liquidation followed by reincorporation).
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made in the Ways and Means or Senate Finance Committee Reports47
to the effect that it is intended that the new "party to a reorganization"
rules cover step transactions having the effect of "C" reorganizations. 48
Perhaps the £nal Regulations will recognize the existence of the "step
transaction" rule so that a corporate acquisition of assets which is immediately preceded by a corporate acquisition of stock will benefit from the
'i>tatutory alleviation of the harsh Groman and Bashford rules.

2. Division of transferred assets between parent and subsidiary
corporation in "C" reorganization. That the statutory modification of
the Groman and Bashford rules was not adequately accomplished by
the legislative draftsmen is further indicated by the provision that a
transaction otherwise qualifying under the "C" reorganization definition shall not be disqualified ''by reason of the fact that part or all of
the assets which were acquired in the transaction are transferred to a
corporation49 controlled by the corporation acquiring such assets."50
It would appear from a strict reading of this language that Corporation
P must be used as a conduit if it is desired to transfer part of Corporation W s assets to Corporation P and the remainder to Corporation A;
a transfer directly to Corporation A of part of Corporation W's assets
47 Cf. Statement of A. W. Gregg, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury,
prepared for the use of the members of the House Committee on Ways and Means, :in
connection with the Treasury Draft of the Revenue Bill of 1924:
"A corporation :in connection with a reorganization may dispose of its assets :in one of
three ways: It may transfer them to a new corporation :in exchange for stock or cash; it
may transfer them to the new corporation, the consideration being the payment by the new
corporation of stock or cash to the stockholders of the old corporation; or the new corporation may buy, with its stock and cash, from the stockholders of the old corporation their
stock, and then liquidate the old corporation. • •• subdivision (E) [predecessor to I.R.C.
(1954), §36l(b)] has been so drafted that the tax liability on the selling corporation is
the same, no matter which of the three methods set out above is adopted. • • ." The
NBw Yorur T1MEs, January 5, 1924, p. 8:4.
48 Cf. I.R.C. (1954), §368(a)(2)(A), which specifically treats "C" reorganizations
which also meet the "D" requirements as "D" reorganizations; ALI Draft, §X60l(b),
discussed :in Comment, February 1954 Draft, American Law Institute Income Tax Project,
Vol. II, pp. 310-311, which requires that a transaction be treated as a recapitalization rather
than a "B" reorganization wherever the shareholders of a transferor corporation have "a
50 per centum stock interest" [the Comment at p. 311 refers to this as "voting control"]
of the acquiring corporation immediately after the transaction. The term "stock :interest"
is defined :in ALI Draft, §X500(f).
49 Query whether "a corporation" must be read "a single corporation," or whether
it can be read "a corporation or corporations." Cf. Tulsa Oxygen Co., 18 B.T.A. 1283
(1930), a pre-Groman decision, where Corporation A transferred its assets to Corporations
C, D and E, subsidiaries of Corporation B, under a contract with Corporation C, for
shares of stock :in Corporation B, paid by Corporation D. The Board of Tax Appeals held
that this was a tax-free reorganization, implying that Corporation B was a party thereto.
See Commissioner v. Fifth Avenue Bank of New York, (3d Cir. 1936) 84 F. (2d) 787 at
789.
50 I.R.C. (1954), §368(a)(2)(C).
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and a transfer to Corporation P of the remainder may not qualify as a
"C" reorganization, and gain or loss may be fully recognized in such a
transaction.5 1
The distinction between a direct and an indirect transfer of part
of Corporation W's assets to Corporation A can be a real one to the
corporations involved. It is one which cannot easily be dismissed,
even apart from the unreasonable duplication of real estate transfer
taxes and other burdens which may be occasioned by an indirect
transfer. For example, there may be provisions in a loan agreement
which would prevent any transfer of the parent's fixed assets without
the lender's approval, and in particular cases such approval may not
be forthcoming. Perhaps in such a situation, where the assets of
Corporation W are to be divided between a parent and a subsidiary, a
net effect:5 2 or inverse step transaction rule may permit the solution
( where non-tax circumstances require this course) of Corporation W
first transferring its entire assets to Corporation A, and then Corporation A immediately transferring a part of those assets to Corporation P.
This approach is favored by at least two court decisions under prior
law, although it perhaps may not be available now because of the
precise language used in the 1954 code.
In Gertrude B. Chase53 Republic Steel Company desired to obtain
a controlling stock in interest in Truscon Steel Company. Because of
a restriction in a mortgage on Republic's property, Republic found it
could not directly acquire the stock of Truscon Steel without thereby
preventing the latter from issuing securities or borrowing money. Re-public therefore formed a new subsidiary, Truscon Holding Company,.
to acquire and hold the stock of Truscon Steel (thus avoiding applica•
51 ALI Draft, §X602(d) presents a more sensible rule. Comment, February 1954
Draft, American Law Institute Income Tax Project, Vol. II, p. 315, illustrates the proposed
rule as follows: "Under this Draft, Corporation A may transfer all or part of its properties
to Corporation B and the remainder to Corporation C which is in control of Corporation B
in exchange for ••• C's shares. It will be noted, however, that under this Draft the transferor may receive only stock of the parent." An equivalent provision (applying only where
Corporation Bis wholly owned by Corporation C) was contained in §125 of H.R. 7738,
81st Cong., 2d sess. (1950), introduced by Representative Camp at the request of the Tax
Section of the American Bar Association. See the discussion in Part IV infra as to whose
stock may be received.
52Cf. Gunby, Inc. v. Helvering, (D.C. Cir. 1941) 122 F. (2d) 203; Thurber v.
Commissioner, (1st Cir. 1936) 84 F. (2d) 815; Walter S. Heller, 2 T.C. 371, 383 (1943),
affd. (9th Cir. 1945) 147 F. (2d) 376, cert. den. 325 U.S. 868, 65 S.Ct. 1405 (1945).
But cf. Woodworth v. Commissioner, (6th Cir. 1955) 218 F. (2d) 719. See the statement of Judge Hill, made in another connection, in Herbert G. Hanan, 3 T.C.M. 670 at
672, July 7, 1944: "••• If a bridge is out [standing] to a traveler going from north to
south, it is likewise out [standing] to a traveler going from south to north."
53 44 B.T.A. 39 (1941) (reviewed) non-acq. 1941-l Cum. Bul. 13; 1942-1 Cum. Bul.
20, affd. per curiam (2d Cir. 1942) 128 F. (2d) 740.
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tion of the restriction) until the restriction was terminated through the
satisfaction of the mortgage. Pursuant to an exchange offer the taxpayer
turned over her stock in T ruscon Steel to T ruscon Holding Company
and received in exchange therefor stock of Republic. About a year
later, after the mortgage was satisfied, Truscon Holding Company was
merged into Republic. T ruscon Steel was thereafter operated as a
subsidiary of· Republic.
The Chase case decided that the temporary holding of the T ruscon
Steel stock by Republic's wholly-owned subsidiary did not prevent
the treatment of the exchange as a nontaxable reorganization. The
Board of Tax Appeals found that the intermediate step whereby
Republic's subsidiary held the T ruscon Steel stock was merely transitory, and was to be given no weight. This decision was affirmed per
curiam by the Second Circuit. The same result was reached by the
Sixth Circuit in the companion Margaret Kahn54 case, which relied in
part "upon the application of principles discussed by us in Commissioner
v. Ashland & Refining Co . . . ." In other words, a "net effect"
and "step transaction" rule was applied-the substantial result which
was intended by both parties to the transaction, and which in fact was
effectuated, was a transfer of stock to Republic.
Suppose that in the Chase case it had been the intention of
Republic to acquire all of the assets of T ruscon Steel and then to
transfer a part of such assets to a newly-formed subsidiary. Should the
fact that non-tax considerations would cause Republic to alter the
mechanics of the transaction and have the newly-formed subsidiary first
receive the assets, with a transfer to Republic at the earliest opportunity
of those assets wanted by Republic, cause the transaction to fall outside of the new "C" reorganization definition? Since the Internal
Revenue Service still nonacquiesces in the result in the Chase case and
the Proposed Regulations ignore the existence of a net effect rule,
apparently certainty will be achieved readily only through a clarifying
amendment to the statute. It would appear that Congress never
intended in this situation to spell out a detailed order of transfers, for
such an attempt "would make it difficult for necessary business transactions to be carried out with a minimum degree of interference
from the tax laws."55

3. Assumption of liabilities of transferor in "C" reorganization.
Another aspect of the net effect problem appears in the application of
54

Commissioner v. Kahn, (6th Cir. 1942) 133 F. (2d) 199.
Senate Report, p. 42.

55 Cf.
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the assumption of liability provisions governing Groman-type "C" reorganizations. There is a "C" reorganization where substantially all
of the assets of Corporation W are transferred to Corporation P in
exchange for voting stock of Corporation P and the assumption of
Corporation W's liabilities by Corporation P, even though the latter
forthwith transfers all or a part of Corporation W's assets to Corporation A.116 The assumption of Corporation Ws liabilities in such
circumstances does not prevent the exchange from being treated as
an exchange of assets "solely" for voting stock. However, should the
statutory language be explicitly followed there would be no transfer
of assets "solely" for voting stock if the assets of Corporation W are
transferred directly to Corporation A and if Corporation P (in order to
"dress up" the subsidiary's balance sheet, for example) assumes the
liabilities of Corporation W in addition to giving its voting stock.
Nevertheless, since one procedure has received legislative sanction, a
less cumbersome and more direct procedure having the same net result
should a fortiori be permitted. The Proposed Regulations do not find
a constructive indirect:57 transfer in such cases. This is regrettable,
for if a parent is permitted to assume a liability of the transferor in a
two-step transaction but not in a one-step transaction, there will be
situations where reorganizations will be unduly complicated and costly,
and in some instances prevented entirely, because of the artificial tax
strictures of section 368(a) as so interpreted.
The other side of the coin is that unless the same end result arrived
at by different routes has a uniformly applied tax consequence, section
368(a)(l)(C) may provide a loophole where the transferor corporation or its shareholders sustains a loss upon the transfer. The transferor
may be able deliberately to cause the loss to be recognized through the
device of transferring substantially all of its assets directly to a subsidiary whose parent assumes the transferor's liabilities, such as its
accounts payable, unsecured notes payable or debentures.58 The
courts have said on numerous occasions that the substance of a transaction, rather than its mere form, controls tax liability. "A given
result at the end of a straight path is not made a different result because
reached by following a devious path."59 But here it is the devious
116 I.R.C.

(1954), §368(a)(l)(C) and (2)(C).
Davis v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1939) 26 F. Supp. 1007, note 41 supra;
Gertrude B. Chase, 44 B.T.A. 39 (1941), note 53 supra.
ISB There are of course other ways in which recognition of loss can be achieved by the
transferor or its shareholders. Because of the new 80% - 20% rule of I.R.C. (1954),
§368(a)(2)(B), it is somewhat more difficult than under the 1939 code to achieve this
result through the giving of some "boot" to the transferor.
ISO Minnesota Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609 at 613, 58 S.Ct. 393 (1938).
111 Cf.
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(two-step) path which the words of the statute requires for nonrecognition of loss (or gain). A sensible interpretive approach would
be to prevent a recognized loss from being achieved where a transaction takes a straight (one-step) path which reaches the same destination as does the long way round. It would avoid controversy and
litigation if the situation were clarified by future legislation.

II.

AcQu1srnoN OF STOCK "SoLELY" FOR VoTING STOCK

The 1939 code60 defined a "B" reorganization as "the acquisition
by one corporation in exchange solely for all or a pait of its voting
stock: of at least 80 per centum of the voting stock and at least 80 per
centum of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock of
another corporation . . . ." The House Bill61 substituted for this
the concept of a "corporate acquisition of stock," which it defined,
subject to two limitations, as "the acquisition in a single transaction,
by one corporation, in exchange for all or part of its participating
stock,62 of stock of another corporation . . . ." The £rst limitation
required that "immediately after the acquisition the acquiring corporation has 'control' of such other [acquired] corporations ( whether or
not such acquiring corporation had control immediately prior to the
acquisition)." The second required that a "relative size" (also called
the "4 to I") requirement be met. 63
60 Section
61 Section

112(g)(l)(B).
359(b). Cf. American Law Institute Income Tax Project, February 1954
Draft, §X601, entitled "Corporate Acquisitions of Stock."
62 ''Participating stock," as defined in House Bill, §312(b), was generally the
garden variety of ·common stock, whether voting or nonvoting. See House Report, p. A98.
Thus, the House Bill did not contain a solely for voting stock requirement.
Cf. American Law Institute Income Tax Project, February 1954 Draft, §§X601(a)
and X602(a), which drop the solely for voting stock requirement of the ''B" and "C''
reorganization definitions in favor of a voting or nonvoting stock requirement. Although
the Reporters view the "solely" for voting stock rule as "inconsequential," they deem the
proportion of total voting stock held after the transfer by the shareholders of the transferor
as "significant." As they phrase it, "it is believed that where the percentage of voting
power in the acquiring corporation represented by the exchanged shares exceeds a certain
figure, the transaction may properly be viewed as a reorganization rather than as a sale.•••
While a decision of this sort is necessarily arbitrary, ••• [20%] commends itself as most
indicative of the fact that a reorganization, rather than a sale, has occurred." Comment,
February 1954 Draft, American Law Institute Income Tax Project, Vol. II, p. 312. See
also p. 309.
An alternative provision in the February 1954 Draft is that a corporate acquisition
of stock or property will qualify as a reorganization regardless of changes in voting power
if the transferors receive stock valued at 20% or more of the value of all the acquiring
corporation's outstanding stock, for "where a corporation exchanges stock of its own of a
sufficiently high value for the stock [property] of a second corporation, the transaction
may properly be viewed as a reorganization rather than a single purchase by the acquiring
corporation from the transferors••••" Id. at pp. 309-310, 313.
63 This requirement attempted to come to grips with the "continuity of interest''
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A "B" reorganization under the 1954 code is in essence a "corporate
acquisition of stock" under the House Bill, but without the "relative
size" requirement, and without a specific reference to the stock being
acquired in "a single transaction." 64 Section 368(a)(l)(B) defines
. . ,,
as a "reorgamzation
"... the acquisition by one corporation, in exchange solely
for all or a part of its voting stock, of stock of another corporation
if, immediately after the acquisition, the acquiring corporation
has control65 of such other corporation ( whether or not such
acquiring corporation had control immediately before the acquisi. ) . . . ."
tion
The parenthetical expression, retained from the House Bill, is
the so-called "creeping control" amendment. In effect, the "creeping
control" amendment treats as acquired in exchange for voting stock,
for "B" reorganization purposes, any stock of a corporation which is
acquired by another corporation prior to the transaction which results
in the latter acquiring (solely for its voting stock) sufficient additional
problem by providing a statutory definition. See SoMMARY OF H.R. 8300, THE PROPOSED
INTERNAL REVENUE ConE oF 1954 As PASSED BY THE HoosE oF REPRESENTATIVES, which
was prepared for the use of the Senate Committee on Finance by the technical staff of the
Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, Hearings Before the Senate Committee on
Finance, 83d Cong., 2d sess., on H.R. 8300, Part 1, pp. 1, 33 (April 7 and 8, 1954). It was
rejected by the Senate Finance Committee after strong opposition voiced at the Hearings
on H.R. 8300 held before that committee. See, for example, Statement of Thomas N. Tarleau, Chairman, Section of Taxation, American Bar Association, Hearings Before the Committee on Finance, United States Senate, 83d Cong., 2d sess., on H.R. 8300, Part 1, p. 325
et seq. (April 7 and 8, 1954); Statement of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States
on H.R. 8300, Hearings Before the Committee on Finance, 83d Cong., 2d sess., on H.R.
8300, Part 4, pp. 1945, 1956-1957 (April 22 and 23, 1954).
It is interesting to note that the Ways and Means Committee Report nowhere mentions the "continuity of interest" requirement in connection with corporation acquisitions
of stock or property. Neither does the Comment, February 1954 Draft, American Law
Institute Income Tax Project, Vol. II, pp. 311-315, with respect to ALI Draft, §X602
("C'' reorganizations), although it specifically states at p. 311 that "no continuity of interest" rule is superimposed upon ALI Draft, §X601 (''B" reorganizations). See note 62
supra. See also Cohen, Surrey, Tarleau and Warren, "A Technical Revision of the Federal
Income Tax Treatment of Corporate Distributions to Shareholders,'' 52 Cor.. L. REv. 1
at 47 (1952).
64 This last omission was probably due to an oversight. Cf. Senate Report, p. 273.
65 I.R.C. (1954), §368(c) defines "control" as "the ownership of stock possessing at
least 80 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of swck entitled to vote
and at least 80 percent of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock of the
corporation." (Italics supplied.) Thus, the extent of the stock required to be obtained in
a "B" reorganization under the 1954 code differs somewhat from the 1939 code requirement.
Note that 80% of each class of voting stock of the acquired corporation is not needed.
As to nonvoting stock, only 80% of the total number of shares of all classes of nonvoting
stock is needed, without regard to fair market values. Cf. Comment, February 1954 Draft,
American Law Institute Income Tax Project, Vol. II, pp. 309-310, discussing ALI Draft,
§X601(a)(2). See note 62 supra.
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shares of the former to give it "control." Stated more simply, if
Corporation A purchases 30 percent of the common stock (the only
class of stock outstanding) of Corporation W for cash in 1955, and
thereafter in a separate transaction in 1956 acquires an additional 60
percent of the common stock of Corporation W for its own voting
stock, no gain or loss will be recognized with respect to the exchange
in 1956 because the "B" reorganization requirements will be met.
Under the 1939 code, this would not have been so because the original
30 percent had not been acquired solely for Corporation A's voting
stock. 66
The Senate Finance Committee obviously intended to liberalize
the old law by extending the scope of the "B" reorganization definition. However, the Proposed Regulations narrow the interpretation
made by the old Regulations in an important respect. 67
The 1939 code required the acquisition "of at least 80 per centum
of the voting stock and at least 80 per centum of the total number
of shares of other classes of stock of another corporation," and such
acquisition had to be solely for all or a part of the voting stock of the
acquiring corporation. The Regulations68 under the 1939 code merely
require that the acquisition by the acquiring corporation "of the
required amount of the stock" of the acquired corporation "must be
in exchange solely for all or a part of the voting stock of the acquiring
corporation." Presumably, if in a single transaction Corporation A
acquired 80 percent of Corporation W's common stock (the only class
outstanding) for part of its own voting stock, it could acquire additional
shares of Corporation W s common stock for cash without prejudicing
the· treatment of the transaction as a "B" reorganization. In fact, the
66 Robert A. Pulfer, 43 B.T.A. 677 (1941), affd. (6th Cir. 1942) 128 F. (2d) 742.
Cf. Mahlon D. Thatcher, 46 B.T.A. 869 at 880-881 (1942), revd. on other grounds sub
nom. Commissioner v. Huntzinger, (10th Cir. 1943) 137 F. (2d) 128.
67 In addition, Proposed Regulations, § I.368-3(a) perpetuate the (to my mind)
erroneous interpretation of Treas. Reg. ll8, §39.ll2(g)-6, that the corporation whose
stock is being acquired must actually adopt the plan of reorganization. This requirement,
which has no statutory basis, first appeared in Treas. Reg. 86, art. ll2(g)-6(a) (1934
Act). That the Proposed Regulations are invalid is evident from the discussion in Groman
v. Commissioner [302 U.S. 82 at 87, 58 S.Ct. 108 (1937)] of 1928 Act, §ll2(i)(2),
which corresponds to I.R.C. (1954), §368(h)(2) ("Indiana, as such, was not a party to
any agreement and took no corporate action." Nevertheless Indiana was found to be a
"party to the reorganization."). But cf. Mahlon D. Thatcher, note 66 supra. See Merritt,
"Tax-Free Acquisition of Corporate Business," N.Y.U. 13TH .ANNuAL INsnTUTB ON
FEDERAL TAXATION 693 at 725-727 (1955) for a further discussion of this problem.
BS Treas. Reg. 118, §39.112(g)-2(c). This provision first appeared in Treas. Reg. 86,
art. 112(g)-2, interpreting the 1934 Act. Cf. Stockton Harbor Industrial Co. v. Com·
missioner, (9th Cir. 1954) 216 F. (2d) 638 at 645, cert. den. (U.S. 1955) 75 S.Ct. 581:
''The only properties which can be considered are those exchanged,-one for the other."
("C" reorganization.)
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Senate Finance Committee Report seems to recognize this by stating
that under the 1939 code one corporation could "acquire enough stock
of another corporation to get control of the second corporation solely
for its own voting stock" under a tax-free "B" reorganization.69 Nevertheless, as we shall see, the described result was uncertain under the
1939 code.
The 1954 code presents its own problems of interpretation. Section 368(a)(l)(B) describes a general situation, i.e., the acquisition,
in exchange solely for all or a part of the voting stock of an acquiring
corporation, of stock of another corporation. It then states that such
an exchange will constitute a "B" reorganization "if, immediately
after the acquisition, the acquiring corporation has control of such
other corporation ( whether or not such acquiring corporation had
control immediately before the acquisition)." This is interpreted by
the following example given in section l.368-2(c) of the Proposed
Regulations: "If, for example, Corporation X, in one transaction
exchanges nonvoting preferred stock or bonds in addition to all or a
part of its voting stock in the acquisition oP0 stock of Corporation Y,
the transaction is not a reorganization under section 368(a)(l)(B)."
It would appear that a justifiable and perhaps more proper interpretation of section 368(a)(l)(B) is the following: "If in one transaction
Corporation X exchanges all or a part of its voting stock in the acquisition of stock of Corporation Y, which acquisition gives Corporation X
'control' of Corporation Y, then the transaction will be treated as a
reorganization under section 368(a)(l)(B) even though in the same
or a previous or later transaction Corporation X acquires or acquired
additional shares of stock of Corporation Y for its nonvoting preferred
stock or bonds, or cash or other boot."
If the Treasury should ultimately accept this interpretation, it may
seek to put an overall limitation on "creeping control" situations by
providing that if in the transaction which the .taxpayer wishes to qualify
as a "B" reorganization there is boot given in exchange for a part of
the stock of Corporation Y, then there will be a "B" reorganization
6 9 Emphasis added. No authoritative interpretation indicates whether the 80%
control could be acquired through the "tacking on" of several acquisitions made solely for
voting stock, but the consensus seems to be that it could. See Cohn, "What Is Meant by
'Control Immediately After the Transfer' in the Tax-Free Reorganization and Exchange
Provisions'?" N.Y.U. 8TH AmroAL lNsnTaTB ON FEDERAL TAXATION 129 at 133 (1950);
Darrell, "Corporate Organizations and Reorganizations Under the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954," 32 TAXEs 1007 at 1012-1013 (1954). Cf. Hendricks, ''Federal Income Tax:
Definition of 'Reorganization,'" 45 HA:av. L. REv. 648 at 654-655 (1932) (1928 Act).
70 At this point Treas. Reg. 118, §39.112(g)-2(c) contain the words "the required
amount of." See note 68 supra.
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only if the stock constituting "control" was in fact acquired solely
for voting stock of Corporation X. However, to be consistent in
interpretation, it would seem that even here the prior acquired stock
should be treated under the 1954 code as if acquired solely for voting
stock, and that in the transaction which the taxpayer seeks to qualify
as a "B" reorganization only sufficient additional stock to constitute
"controf' need be acquired solely for voting stock of Corporation Y.
Of course, only the latter transaction would constitute an exchange as
to which gain or loss is not recognized. The import of the "single transaction" concept in such a situation would be that only such stock as is
acquired solely for voting stock in the single transaction which brings
about "control" would be exchanged tax-free. Caution would indicate
the avoidance of a single transaction wherein both voting stock and
boot is given by Corporation X, and where the stock of Corporation Y
acquired solely for voting stock of Corporation X is not sufficient in
itself to bring about a meeting of the "control" definition.
Because of the intent to liberalize the "B" and "C" reorganization
definitions by the 1954 code, interpretations made of earlier law with
respect to the acquisition "solely" for voting stock requirement are not
to be regarded as precedents in interpreting section 368(a)(l)(B).
Moreover, it is my opinion that the only court decision under prior
law which deals with the particular phase of that requirement under
discussion here is inconclusive if not incorrect. In Commissioner 11.
Air Reduction Co. 71 Corporation A acquired all 132,299 shares of
Corporation W's outstanding stock through acquiring 87,275 shares
for its own voting stock and 7,906 shares for cash prior to 1935, and
acquired 14,771 shares for cash and 22,347 shares for its own voting
stock (treasury shares) in 1935. Although 82.6 percent of Corporation W's shares were acquired for voting stock, the Second Circuit,
reversing the Board of Tax Appeals, held that the acquisition of the
22,347 shares did not constitute a "B" reorganization under the 1934
Act and that Corporation A realized gain on the exchange of its treasury shares.
The Second Circuit's opinion was predicated principally on the
ground that Corporation A was dealing in its treasury shares as it
would in the shares of another corporation. 72 However, it also held
to be untenable the taxpayer's alternative contention that there was a
11 (2d Cir. 1942) 130 F. (2d) 145, revg. and remanding 1941 P-H B.T.A. Mem.
Dec. ,r41,266, May 19, 1941, cert. den. 317 U.S. 681, 63 S.Ct. 201 (1942).
12 Cf. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 2 T.C. 827 (1943), appeal to 6th Circuit dismissed June 19, 1944. But see I.R.C. (1954), §§362(b) and 1032.
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"B" reorganization, for according to the Second Circuit the statutory
definition under the prior law "contemplates only situations where
the exchange is made 'solely' for voting stock. Here over 17 percent
of the Pure Carbonic stock was purchased for cash. Cf. Helvering v.
Southwest Consolidated Corp., 315 U.S. 194, 62 S. Ct. 546. . . ." 73
The comparison of the facts in the Air Reduction case with those in
Southwest Consolidated was not an apt one. Southwest Consolidated
Corporation had acquired all the properties of a bankrupt corporation
in exchange for a part of its voting stock, stock warrants, and the payment of cash to certain creditors of the bankrupt corporation. The
cash was raised during the reorganization on a loan from a bank. The
Supreme Court held that under the particular facts, the substance
of the transaction was precisely the same as if Southwest Consolidated
had paid cash plus voting stock and stock warrants for the properties.
Moreover, the stock warrants which were issued were held not to be
"voting stock." There was thus no meeting of the applicable reorganization requirement that substantially all the properties of one
corporation be acquired solely for all or a part of the voting stock of the
acquiring corporation.
Some recent decisions indicate that had substantially all the transferor corporation's property in the Southwest Consolidated case been
acquired solely for voting stock of the acquiring corporation, with an
inconsequential portion of the properties of the transferor being used
to satisfy the claims of nonassenting creditors, a "C" reorganization
would have been found. 74 A corresponding interpretation should be
· · reqmrements.
·
The "B" reorganiza·
made of the "B" reorganization
tion definition contemplates that as little as 80 percent "control," and
no more, can be acquired by the acquiring corporation in a "B" reorganization solely for voting stock. If this can be done in a tax-free
transaction by the giving of voting stock of Corporation A, even though
20 percent of the stock of Corporation W is not acquired by Corporation A, it makes no sense to destroy the tax-free nature of the exchange
73130 F. (2d) 145 at 148. Judge Learned Hand, who dissented on the main point,
did not mention this portion of the majority's opinion. The only portion of the govern•
ment's brief which dealt with this question was a footnote (p. 21) that there was not a
tax-free reorganization "because both cash and taxpayer's own shares were used in the
acquisition," citing the Southwest Consolidated Corp. decision.
Query whether the Second Circuit majority was inHuenced not only by the treasury
stock aspect of the case, but also by the fact that all the additional shares acquired in 1935
were acquired from one stockholder, without any written plan of reorganization being
adopted. Cf. William Hewitt, 19 B.T.A. 771 (1930), note 81 infra.
74Roosevelt Hotel Co., 13 T.C. 399 at 408 (1948) (reviewed) acq. 1950-1 Cum.
Bul. 4; Southland Ice Co., 5 T.C. 842 at 850 (1945) (reviewed) acq. 1946-1 Cum. Bul. 4.
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by penalizing the parties to the qualifying exchange because in the
same transaction, or in a prior or contemporaneous transaction, some
of the remaining 20 percent is acquired for boot:
For example, Corporation A might desire to acquire all of the
common stock (the only class outstanding) of Corporation W. It feels
that 80 percent or more of the shareholders of Corporation W would
be willing to exchange their shares in a tax-free exchange for a part
of its own voting stock, but that some small minority would not accept
an exchange offer, although they would be likely to accept a cash offer
resulting in recognized capital gain (or loss) to them. 75 Assuming the
problem of settling the conditions of the cash· offer is met so that an
undue number of shareholders are not encouraged to request cash, and
yet the terms are such that all, or almost all, of the stock is gotten in
hand, why should the otherwise qualifying tax-free reorganization be
penalized because some shareholders choose to take cash for their
shares? It is submitted that such a transaction is probably permitted
under section 368(a)(l)(B) of the 1954 code. To hold otherwise
would be to treat the 1954 code as a patchwork quilt with no organized
pattern.
I think we are justified in assuming that the basic congressional
aims with respect to "B" and "C" reorganizations are the same-if
Corporation A acquires substantially all of the properties (or 80 percent
under the 80 percent-20 percent rule76 ) of Corporation W, or stock representing 80 percent "control" of Corporation W, in exchange solely for
all or a part of its voting stock, then Corporation W or its shareholders
are considered to have retained a sufficient continuity of interest in
the business enterprise conducted by Corporation W to warrant the
application of the tax-free reorganization rules. It is doubtful that
Congress intended that if in a single transaction Corporation A acquires
80 percent of Corporation W's common stock (the only class outstanding) and in the same or a contemporaneous transaction acquires the
75 Cf. Daisy M. Ward, 2.9 B.T.A. 1251 (1934) (reviewed) non-acq. XIlI-1 Cum.
Bul. 31 (1934), petition for review dismissed (8th Cir. 1935) 79 F. (2d) 381, where a
repurchase by Corporation A of its stock, upon demand of Corporation W shareholders,
pursuant to an agreement giving them an option to sell, was held to be a separate transaction; The Fifth Avenue Bank of New York, 31 B.T.A. 945 at 950 (1934), affd. (3d Cir.
1936) 84 F. (2d) 787.
The problems involved when dealing with minority shareholders who want cash
are discussed (with particular reference to the 1928 Act) in M!Lum, HENDRICKS AND
EVBllE'lT, RBoaGANIZAnoNs AND Ormm ExCHANoES IN FEDERAL lNcoME TAXAnoN 112114 (1931).
16 See Part ill(A) infra.
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remaining 20 percent for cash, this will disqualify the reorganization
from tax-free status. I suppose the Treasury could contend that where
a particular shareholder of Corporation W exchanges some of his
stock for voting stock and some for cash, this should be treated as
an exchange of Corporation W stock, considered as a unit, for voting
stock plus cash, thus violating the solely for voting stock requirement.77
But the terms of the exchange can be made such that the stock given
up cannot readily be so unitized.78 Moreover, as a practical matter,
it is not likely that a shareholder who elects to take voting stock will
also elect to take some boot which could be taxable as ordinary income.79
But even apart from these reasons, there is an even more obvious
reason for regarding the Proposed Regulations as ill-conceived. Under
the "creeping control" amendment 20 percent, or indeed any larger or
smaller percentage, of Corporation W's stock can be acquired for cash
or other boot, and if a subsequent exchange yielding 80 percent "control" is made solely for voting stock of Corporation A, the latter exchange constitutes a "B" reorganization. Surely, the fact that a part of
Corporation W's stock is acquired for boot contemporaneously with
or in the same transaction as that in which 80 percent or more of its
stock is acquired solely for voting stock of Corporation A, should not
disqualify the "B" reorganization, when giving equivalent boot in
either an earlier or a later separate transaction would not prevent the
exchange from being tax-free. If these transactions are not to be accorded similar treatment under the 1954 code, then legislative action
would seem indicated to state clearly an 80-20 percent rule applicable
to "B" reorganization in the same manner that such a rule now governs
"C" reorganizations.80 They day should come when the Internal Revenue Code is a well-ordered universe.
77 Cf. Treusch, "Corporate Distributions and Adjustments: Recent Case Reminders
of Some Old Problems Under the New Code," 32 TAXEs 1023 at 1030, n. 93 and text to
n. 104 (1954). The extreme of this view is that a reorganization would not qualify as
tax-free where a corporation purchases a single share of stock of another corporation for
cash and simultaneously acquires all the remaining shares of stock of such corporation in
exchange for a part of its voting stock.
78 Cf. Harlow W. Davock, 20 T.C. 1075 (1953); Owen v. United States, (D.C.
Neb. 1951) 99 F. Supp. 855.
79 See I.R.C. (1954), §356(a)(2).
80 Cf. the history of the Revenue Act of 1921. Originally the Senate Finance Committee proposed that an acquisition of stock should include substantially all the stock, just
as an acquisition of property under that act required that substantially all the properties
be acquired. On the Senate floor, an amendment was made to require merely the acquisition of a majority of the voting stock and a majority of the total number of shares of all

934

M1cmcAN LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 53

Where the stock acquired for cash is purchased from shareholders
of Corporation W who do not exchange other stock of Corporation W
for voting stock of Corporation A, the issue is clear-cut, for the "unitization" argument is not available to the.Treasury. If the exchange offer
which constitutes the plan of reorganization only invites an exchange of
stock of Corporation W for voting stock of Corporation A, and apart
from the plan the latter purchases some stock of Corporation W for
cash, it would appear that this would constitute a transaction separate
from the reorganization81 even though consummated during the period
of the exchange offer. It is inconceivable that this cash purchase
should destroy the tax-free character of the exchanges made under the
reorganization plan, whereunder in an unrelated "single transaction"82
Corporation A acquires "control" of Corporation W solely in exchange
for a part of Corporation A's voting stock.
Interestingly enough, in the really close case, the Service has used
a fiction to help bring a reorganization within the "B" reorganization
definition. Recently Standard Oil Company, which had acquired
72.32 percent of the outstanding common stock (the only class outstanding) of Humble Oil & Refining Company in prior years, offered
to the minority shareholders of Humble the opportunity to exchange
ten shares of Humble common stock for nine shares of voting stock of
Standard. The offer was conditional upon Humble shareholders tendering sufficient shares for exchange by November 30, 1954 to give
Standard 80 percent control of Humble.83 No fractional shares were
other classes of stock of the acquired corporation. The Senate Hoor discussion indicates
conflicting views as to the purpose of the amendment. See BAAB. AND Moruus, HmDBN
TAXEs IN CoRPoRATB REonGANIZATioNs 56-57 (1935); 61 CoNG. REc. 6561-6567 (Oct.
21, 1921); Conference Committee Report on Revenue Bill of 1921, H. Rep. 486, 67th
Cong., 1st sess., at 17-18, 1939-1 Cum. Bul. (Part 2) 206, 209 (Amendment 47); G.C.M.
8565, IX-2 Cum. Bul. 127 (1930).
s1 Cf. William Hewitt, 19 B.T.A. 771 (1930) (reviewed), appeal dismissed (8th
Cir. 1935) 76 F. (2d) 1011. Pursuant to a plan of reorganization Corporation A offered to
exchange $40 in cash, one-half a share of its preferred stock and one share of its common
stock for each share of common stock tendered by Corporation W's shareholders. Hewitt did
not accept the exchange offer, but negotiated a more advantageous exchange with Corporation A. This individual deal was held not to be part of the plan of reorganization which
otherwise qualified under the 1926 Act.
82 The meaning of this phrase is discusse4 in House Report, pp. Al32-Al33.
83 The purpose of the exchange was to enable Standard to take advantage of the new
"control" rule of I.R.C. (1954), §l504(a), which reduces from 95% to 80% the percentage
ownership of an affiliated corporation required in connection with the filing of a consolidated return.
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issued, but in lieu thereof any shareholder who deposited a number
of shares not divisible by ten was given the option either to sell his
interest in less than one share of Standard or to purchase an interest
sufficient to entitle him to one additional full share of Standard.84
Standard engaged and paid an agent to perform "the necessary ministerial functions attendant to effectuating the exchange of Standard
stock for Humble stock, including the sale or purchase of fractional
interests."
Before consummating the exchange, Standard obtained a Treasury
ruling8 5 that the handling of the fractional shares did not prevent the
transaction from qualifying as a "B" reorganization under the 1954
code. 86 The ruling states, "It will be considered that the stockholders
actually received any fractional shares to which they were entitled.
Upon the sale of any fractional share by the exchange agent for the
account of a particular stockholder, such stockholder will realize gain
or loss measured by the difference between the amount received for
such fractional share and the cost or other basis of his stock of Humble
properly allocable to the fractional share of Standard stock sold . . . ."
Note that the agent, paid in cash by and acting for Standard, is
apparently treated as the agent of the Humble shareholders for the
purpose of receiving fractional (and other) shares of Standard and
selling the fractional shares for cash.87 One explanation for the
favorable Treasury attitude is that Standard gave up solely a part
of its voting stock, and the statute is framed in terms of what the
acquiring corporation gives up, rather than what the shareholders
of the acquired corporation actually take down. This ignores the fact
that the agent was paid in cash and if it acted on behalf of the shareholders, then some cash was paid by Standard to the benefit of the
shareholders; if the agent acted solely on behalf of Standard then in
effect Standard sold the fractional shares and paid a small amount of
cash to some of Humble's shareholders. Either explanation of the
agent's role presents difficulties. The very fact that the Treasury will
accommodate itself to the device employed in the Standard-Humble
8 4 Cf. the approved issuance of scrip certificates for fractional shares in Rev. Rul. 5559, Int. Rev. Bul. 1955-6, 7, dealing with a "C" reorganization.
85 Letter Ruling dated October 28, 1954, bearing symbols 'T:R:R GP."
86 Neither did the fact that Standard paid the agent and the agent's expenses in con·
nection with the exchange, and paid all state and federal issuance and transfer taxes.
87 Cf. Daisy M. Ward, 29 B.T.A. 1251 (1934), note 75 supra; The Fifth Avenue
Bank of New York, 31 B.T.A. 945 (1934), note 75 supra; Rev. Rul. 54-65, 1954-1 Cum.
Bul. 101.
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reorganization indicates the desirability of not construing the "B"
reorganization definition narrowly. Under section 368(a)(l)(B),
properly interpreted, the artificial nature of the procedure would not
have been necessary had Standard been certain that it would obtain
enough shares of Humble for whole shares of Standard to give it 80
percent control of Humble-in such case it could have itself given cash
for fractional shares without the intervention of an agent.

III.

BuYING OuT MmoruTY INTERESTS FOR CASH

When it was desired, under the 1939 code, to buy out a small
minority interest for cash upon the merging of two corporations, a
statutory merger (an "A" reorganization) rather than a "practical
merger" (a "C" reorganization) offered the solution to the problem.
The trouble was that it was (and still is) not always possible to effect
a statutory merger; not all states have merger statutes.88
The striking feature of the "A" reorganization provision under both
the 1939 and 1954 codes89 is that there is no spelling otit of what the
shareholders of the merged or of the continuing corporation must
receive. Thus, it is possible for any combination of voting and nonvoting stock, securities, cash and other property to be received by them
without disqualifying the reorganization from meeting the "A" reorganization requirements. 90
The 1954 code narrows considerably the differences in tax treat- _
ment of "A" and "C" reorganizations. An important change designed
to make practical mergers more feasible from a tax viewpoint is one
providing91 that (I) if a corporation acquires substantially all of the
properties of another corporation, and (2) if the "C" reorganization
definition would be met but for the fact the acquiring corporation exchanges "money or other property" in addition to voting stock, and
88 For a compilation of states not permitting statutory mergers or consolidations of a
"domestic" and a "foreign" corporation, or even of two domestic corporations, see Fahey
"Income Tax Definition of 'Reorganization,'" 39 CoL. L. REv. 933 at 948 (1939). Mr.
Fahey also discusses at pp. 946-947 the application of the "A" reorganization definition
to mergers and consolidation under federal statutes. See also Gutkin, "Merger and Consolidation Problems," N.Y.U. 8TH .ANNuAL lNsTITUTB ON FEDERAL TAXATION 174 at 175
(1950). Some state statutes have been amended since the lists were compiled.
89 I.R.C. (1939), §ll2(g)(l)(A); I.R.C. (1954), §368(a)(l)(A).
90 However, the judicially developed concepts of "continuity of interests" and of
''business purpose" must be met, and the taxation of "boot" provisions must be taken into
account.
91 I.R.C. (1954), §368(a)(l)(B). See Senate Report, pp. 263, 274. Cf. House Bill
§359(c), and the discussion in H. Rep., pp. Al33-Al34.
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(3) if the acquiring corporation acquires solely for its own voting stock
or solely for voting stock of a corporation controlling it, property of the
transferor corporation having a fair market value which is at least
80 percent of the fair market value of all (not merely the transferred
portion) of the transferor corporation's property, then such acquisition ,
will be treated92 as a "C" reorganization. Solely for the purpose of this
determination, "the amount of any liability assumed by the acquiring
corporation and the amount of any liability to which any property
acquired is subject," 93 is treated as money paid for the property.
Thus, under the 1954 code, as long as voting stock is given for
property having a fair market value which is at least 80 percent of the
fair market value of all of the property of the transferor corporation,
the remaining consideration paid by the acquiring corporation can be
money or other property. Moreover, there is no requirement that the
consideration other than voting stock be distributed pro rata to the
stockholders of the transferor corporation.94 Even if a corporation's
entire assets are transferred in a "C" reorganization for voting stock
plus cash not exceeding the 20 percent restriction, the "continuity of
interest" rule will not be violated if one group of shareholders receives
only voting stock and the other group of shareholders receives only
cash.95 All this is in furtherance of the congressional intent to alleviate
the difficulties in completing transactions which existed under the 1939
code where certain shareholders of the transferor corporation wished
to receive property rather than stock in the acquiring corporation.
92 Subject to the provisions of I.R.C. (1954), §368(a)(2)(A), which provides that if
a transaction meets both the "C'! and the "D" reorganization definitions it is treated as a
''D" reorganization.
93 It would seem, since a liability which is assumed may also be a liability to which
an acquired property is subject, that modification of this language would be in order when
the ''Technical Changes Act of 1955" is under consideration.
94 If the transferor corporation does not distribute the money or other property
received (other than stock or securities of the acquiring corporation) in pursuance of the
plan of reorganization, gain will be recognized, but not in excess of the money and fair
market value of other property received and not distributed. I.R.C. (1954), §361(b)(I)(B).
Shareholders of the transferor corporation who wish to receive securities, money or
other property in addition to voting stock, should be aware of the possibility of realization
of some ordinary income under I.R.C. (1954), §356(a)(2). See I.R.C. (1954),
§§354(a)(2), 356(a)(I)(B) and 356(d)(2)(B). Cf. I.R.C. (1954), §302(b).
95 Jmplicit in the adoption of this rule is that paying out 20% of the shareholders in
cash does not run afoul of the "continuity of interest" rule. See Senate Report, p. 52.
See also Lyons, "Realignment of Stockholders' Interests in Reorganizations Under Section
112(g)(I)(D)," 9 TAX L. R.E.v. 237 (1954).
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A. The 80 Percent-20 Percent Rule
The application of the 80 percent-20 percent rule may be illustrated96 as follows: Corporation A has assets worth $100,000 and
$10,000 in liabilities. Corporation Y acquires $98,000 worth of assets
subject to a liability of $10,000. In exchange for these assets, Corporation Y transfers its own voting stock, assumes the $10,000 liability, and
pays $8,000 in cash. This transaction qualifies as a "C" reorganization
even though a part of the assets of Corporation A is acquired for cash.
If, however, the assets of Corporation A in the above example were
subject to $50,000 in liabilities rather than only $10,000, an acquisition of all the assets subject to the liabilities could only be for voting
stock because Corporation A's liabilities alone are in excess of 20 percent of the fair market value of all of the property transferred. In such
a case, a statutory merger or consolidation would be required in order
to have the transaction qualify as a reorganization.97
Although the transferor corporation can transfer up to 20 percent
(in fair market value) of its property for other than voting stock, in.
practice this provision will not have wide application. The reason for
this is the revival to a limited extent of the rule derived from the
Hendler9 8 case, which would treat the assumption by a transferee corporation of the liabilities of a transferor as the receipt of "boot" by the
latter. This "melancholy victory"99 by the government was reversed
by the enactment of section 213 of the Revenue Act of 1939, the provisions of which are continued in the 1954 code.100 Nevertheless,
since the transfer of substantially all of the properties of one corporation
to another in a "C" reorganization situation is commonly accompanied
by the latter assuming the indebtedness of the transferor, any hoped-for
benefit from the liberalization of the "C" reorganization rules by section 368(a)(2)(B) may prove to be illusory in many instances.
96 The illustration is taken from Senate Report, pp. 274-275. See also Proposed
Regulations, § l.368-2(d)(3).
97 H there were some special reasons for not transferring certain assets to the acquiring
corporation, these assets could be distributed to the stockholders of the transferor corporation as part of the plan of reorganization, the state law as to mergers and consolidations
permitting.
9s United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564, 58 S.Ct. 655 (1938), rehearing den. 304
U.S. 588, 58 S.Ct. 940 (1938). The ramifications of the Hendler decision are discussed
in Surrey, "Assumption of Indebtedness in Tax-Free Exchanges," 50 YALE L.J. 1 (1940).
99 See PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXAnoN, Third Series, 138 (1940); Surrey,
"Assumption of Indebtedness in Tax-Free Exchanges," 50 YALE L.J. 1 at 10-14 (1940),
which recite the difficulties the Treasury was faced with after the government won the
Hendler case.
100 See I.R.C. (1954), §§357 and 368(a)(l)(C).
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The assumption of all liabilities of the transferor, including contingent or undisclosed liabilities, could cause a violation of the terms
of 80 percent-20 percent exception which would not show up until
some time after the consummation of the reorganization. The exception in section 368 (a)(2)(B) is not written in terms of the estimated
amount of liabilities assumed, but rather in terms of "the amount,"
which could perhaps be determined by hindsight. The discreet will
therefore, in such circumstances, choose the statutory merger or consolidation route to accomplish their purposes and not risk the uncertainty of a practical merger qualifying as a tax-free "reorganization."
The limited assumption of liabilities could also be considered.
The Proposed Regulations show no awareness of the need to define
what is meant by "the amount" of liabilities assumed. It is arguable
that where all the liabilities of the transferor are assumed by the transferee, including contingent and undisclosed liabilities, "the amount"
of the liabilities for the purpose of applying the 80 percent-20 percent
rule should be the estimated amount value thereof based on the facts
known to the parties on the date of the transfer, rather than the actual
ultimate amount of liability.101 Otherwise, in some instances it may be
years after a transaction takes places before one could be certain that
the terms of the 80 percent-20 percent exception have been met.
There are certain practical difficulties attendant upon the above
suggestion. For one thing, parties to a corporate reorganization would
always run the tax risk, in valuing contingent and disputed liabilities,
that the Service would later1° 2 disagree with the valuation. The Service is especially likely to raise the issue if subsequent events should
be such that the estimated valuation in fact proves to have been too low.
The parties should not be required to run this tax risk where they can
show that the valuation of contingent and disputed liabilities was
arrived at in good faith and as a result of arm's-length negotiations seeking to fix their relative interests.
How should a liability be valued if its actual or potential existence
is undisclosed (innocently or otherwise) by the transferor to the transferee? In such a case there can be no value estimated by the transferee,
lOlCf. dissenting opinion of Justice Reed in Commissioner v. Estate of Louis Sternberger, 348 U.S. 187 at 200, 75 S.Ct. 229 (1955). Interpreting I.R.C. (1939), §812,
which allows as a deduction "the amount of all bequests • • • to • • • any corporation
organized and operated exclusively for ••• charitable ••• purposes ••• ," Justice Reed
states at 201: "It is the 'amount' of the bequest that is deductible-its presently ascertainable value."
102 It is doubtful that the Service would give an advance ruling on the valuation
question. See Int. Rev. - Mimeograph No. 100, Com. No. 11, January 12, 1953, paragraph 4,
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to whom the actual or potential liability has no known existence. Also,
neither party may be aware of the existence of a potential liability.
For example, if the transferee assumes all liabilities, and thereafter
the Service asserts the existence of a completely unexpected tax liability
on the part of the transferor on a theory which everyone had theretofore assumed was clearly settled in favor of the taxpayer,1° 3 whose
judgment as to "the amount" (as of the reorganization date) of the
tax liability assumed by the transferee is to be accepted-the taxpayer's
or the Service's (based on the Service's internal administrative thinking on the problem)? Here again, a party acting in good faith and at
arm's length should be permitted to rely on the estimated value of assumed contingent and other liabilities.
In view of the above difficulties, it is likely that the 80 percent-20
percent rule will in practice be little availed of, except in those cases
where the transferee does not assume contingent and undisclosed liabilities. Perhaps in the future the Congress may see fit to exempt such
liabilities (or indeed, all assumed liabilities)104 from the 80 percent-20
percent formula provided in section 368(a)(2)(B)(ii).
IV.

REcEIPT OF VoTING STOCK OF BoTH AcQUmING CoRPoRATION
AND !Ts PARENT OR SuBSIDIARY IN "C" REORGANIZATION

The new "C" reorganization definition does not specifically permit
the corporation transferring substantially all of its assets ( Corporation
W), or its shareholders, to receive both voting stock pf the acquiring
corporation (Corporation A) and voting stock of its parent (Corporation
P); the acquisition by one corporation of substantially all of the properties of another corporation must be in exchange "solely for all or a
part of its [the acquiring corporation's] voting stock (or in exchange
solely for all or a part of the voting stock of a corporation which is in
control of the acquiring corporation) ...."
It is questionable whether any valid "continuity-of interest" policy
decision underlies this particular legislative restriction. If Congress
has chosen to decree that the transferor corporation (Corporation W)
103 For example, the Godley-Hirshon problem. See Mintz and Plumb, "Dividends in
Kind-The Thunderbolts and the New Look," 10 T.u: L. REv. 41 (1954); Michael P.
Erburu, 23 T.C. No. 104, January 31, 1955.
104Cf. I.R.C. (1954), §368(a)(I)(C): " ••• in determining whether the exchange
is solely for stock the assumption by the acquiring corporation of a liability of the other,
or the fact that property acquired is subject to a liability, shall be disregarded. •• .''
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or its shareholders have a sufficient continuity of interest in the assets
transferred to Corporation A where the consideration for the transfer is
voting stock in Corporation P, it defies logic for it to deny that there is a
sufficient continuity of interest where Corporation W or its shareholders receive not only some voting stock in Corporation P but also voting
stock in Corporation A.105 Indeed, the necessary continuity of interest
was found to exist in such a situation by both the Board of Tax Appeals
and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,1° 6 prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in the Groman case. The restriction is even more perplexing since the possibility exists under the new "C" reorganization
provision of Corporation W transferring its assets to' Corporation A in
exchange for voting stock of Corporation P, and of Corporation A
immediately transferring the assets to a subsidiary of Corporation A.101
The assets of Corporation W in such a case are twice removed from
Corporation P, and yet the Corporation W shareholders, through ownership of a part of Corporation P's voting stock, are deemed to have a
sufficient continuity of interest in the transferred assets to constitute
the transaction as a "C'' reorganization.
Regardless of the failure of section 368(a)(l)(C) specifically to
permit Corporation W or its shareholders to receive both voting stock
of Corporation P and voting stock of Corporation A, the 80 percent20 percent rule does appear to _permit in a limited way the giving
of both Corporation P voting stock and Corporation A voting stock.
The Proposed Regulations do not take this possibility into account, and
the following sentence in section l.368-2(d) of the Proposed Regulations requires modification: "... if the properties of Corporation W
are acquired in exchange for voting stock of both Corporation P and
Corporation A, the transaction will not constitute a reorganization under Section 368(a)(l)(C)."
105 Perhaps what Congress was concerned with here, if it thought of the problem at
all, was the possibility of a "bail-out" should the Corporation W shareholders receive
voting stock of both Corporation P and Corporation A. Cf. I.R.C. (1954), §306.
106 Commissioner v. Fifth Avenue Bank of New York, (3d Cir. 1936), 84 F. (2d)
787, affg. 31 B.T.A. 945 (1934), interpreting the Revenue Act of 1928. Antitoxin
transferred all of its assets to Laboratories (a newly-formed subsidiary of Cyanamid) under
a reorganization agreement drawn up between Antitoxin and Cyanamid, in exchange for
64,500 shares of Cyanamid Class B common and 75,000 shares of Laboratories nonvoting
preferred. Both Cyanamid and Laboratories were held to be parties to the reorganization.
The Third Circuit said: "Undoubtedly, there is the continuity of interest in the Antitoxin
assets through acquisition of the stock in both companies which is stressed in Helvering v.
Minnesota Tea Company••••" 84 F. (2d) 787 at 789.
101 I.R.C. (1954), §368(a)(l)(C) and (2)(C).
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One of the conditions of the 80 percent-20 percent rule is that it
applies only if "the acquisition would qualify under paragraph (l)(C)
but for the fact that the acquiring corporation exchanges money or
other property in addition to voting stock. . . ." Suppose all of the
assets of Corporation W are acquired and 80 percent of the consideration therefor is voting stock of Corporation A and 20 percent is voting
stock of Corporation P ( Corporation A being the acquiring corporation), or suppose it is the other way around and it is 80 percent Corporation P and 20 percent Corporation A voting stock (Corporation P
being the acquiring corporation, with an immediate transfer of Corporation W's assets to Corporation A's). It would appear that the voting
stock in the 20 percent category may properly be treated as "other
property" within the meaning of the above-quoted qualification. There
is nothing in the statute108 which requires that the "money or other
property" referred to in section 368(a)(2)(B)(ii) constitute ''boot,"
the receipt of which is subject to the recognition of gain rules of section 356, or which i:i;idicates that voting stock (or nonvoting stock) of
a party to the reorganization was not meant to be included in the scope
of "other property."
It may be that ultimately the Treasury will recognize, either voluntarily or through judicial mandate, that there is a "C'' reorganization
and that the 80 percent-20 percent rule applies where all of the
assets of Corporation Ware acquired and 80 percent of the consideration therefor is voting stock of Corporation A and 20 percent of the
voting stock of Corporation P ( Corporation A being the acquiring
corporation), or where 80 percent is voting stock of Corporation P and
20 percent is voting stock of Corporation A (Corporation P being the
acquiring corporation, with an immediate transfer of Corporation W's
assets to Corporation A). The Treasury, nevertheless, may couple such
recognition with a contention that the Groman decision is still good
law, and that at least in the case where the 20 percent is voting stock
of Corporation P (Corporation A being the acquiring corporation),
Corporation P is not a party to the reorganization.109 Under this approach the voting stock of Corporation P would constitute ''boot" received as part of a "C" reorganization. However, where Corporation P
is the acquiring corporation, with an immediate transfer of Corporation W's assets to Corporation A, I believe there is substance to the
petition that Corporation A as well as Corporation P is a party to the
10s See
109 But

also Senate Report, p. 52; House Report, p. Al33.
cf. note 106 supra, and the text thereto. See note 36 supra.
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"C" reorganization, and that no "boot" is involved in the transaction.
Indeed, the Bashford case110 assumes this conclusion as to Corporation
A, and the 1954 code111 brings about this result as to Corporation P.
CONCLUSION

It seems appropriate to conclude by quoting Justice Reed's recent
pronouncement:1 12 on the Regulations problem:
"Regulations do not have the safeguards of federal statutory enactments. Interested parties outside the Internal Revenue Service perhaps may not be heard. Reports explaining the
action are not available. Public discussion, such as happens in
Congress, does not take place. In short, we think that reenactment of a statute after the due adoption of a regulation does not
make the regulation a part of the statute. It is only an indication
of congressional purpose to be weighed in the context and circumstances of the statutory language."
When the Proposed Regulations under subchapter C of chapter I
of the 1954 code, which includes the corporate reorganization provisions, were published in the Federal Register on December 11, 1954,
the Treasury announced that prior to the adoption of the final Regulations, consideration will be given to "any data, views, or arguments
pertaining thereto" which were submitted in writing (in duplicate) by
January 10, 1955 to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. This
30-day deadline was later extended to January 24, 1955. It is to be
hoped that the Treasury will carefully consider the suggestions made to
it, bearing constantly in mind that its proper function is to interpret
and administer within the framework of the statutory language and
congressional intent.113 One of the deans of the tax bar has observed,
110 In Commissioner v. Bashford, (3d Cir. 1937) 87 F. (2d) 827, revd. sub nom.
Helvering v. Bashford, 302 U.S. 454, 58 S.Ct. 307 (1938), the Commissioner conceded
that Corporation A was a party to the reorganization; the issue was whether Corporation P
was also a party thereto.
111 Section 368(b), last sentence.
112 Commissioner v. Estate 0£ Louis Sternberger, 348 U.S. 187 at 206, 75 S.Ct. 229
(1955) (dissenting opinion).
113 While the words 0£ Congress often are sufficient in and 0£ themselves to determine
the purpose of legislation, and the plain meaning 0£ the words will be followed, where the
meaning would lead to absurd or futile results, or even merely an unreasonable one "plainly
at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole," the Supreme Court has followed
that policy rather than the literal words. United States v. American Trucking Association,
Inc., 310 U.S. 534 at 543, 60 S.Ct. 1059 (1940); Markham v. Cabell, 326 U.S. 404 at
409, 66 S.Ct. 193 (1945).
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"The government cannot be expected to abandon its past tendency to
press the courts as far as possible to interpret and develop the tax law
in its favor."114 Nevertheless, the exercise of a measure of self-imposed
Treasury restraint when promulgating the final Regulations would be a
wholesome development. Experience indicates that over-zealousness in
taking the narrow view does not always serve the Treasury well, and
that the reasonable approach better serves the common weal.116
114Darrell, ''The Internal Revenue Code of 1954," 1955 SoUTHBJIN CALIPoRNIA
TAX INSTITUTE 1 (1955). It is equally true, as Mr. Darrell observes, that "Taxpayers
cannot be expected to cease their never ending search for means of cutting down their
taxes."
·
115 See, for example, the article and treatise cited in note 99 supra, discussing the
Treasury's difficulties with the problem of assumption of indebtedness in coiporate reorganizations.

